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Interpreting November 2007 
The events of November 2007 in Georgia were seen by many as evidence of the failure of 
the Rose Revolution. Images of security forces using fire hoses, tear gas, and other 
violent means to disperse relatively peaceful demonstrations, followed by arrests and the 
temporary suspension of free speech and assembly were clearly incompatible with the 
image Georgia still enjoyed at that time of being – in what now seem like ill-chosen 
words by President Bush – as a "beacon of democracy" in the region. Not surprisingly, 
these events substantially damaged that image. 
If one judges these events through the prism of European and American expectations, it is 
clear that they demonstrated the shortcomings of the Rose Revolution's democratic 
promise, but viewed through the prism of the Georgian government, one arrives at a very 
different conclusion. For the government, the November crackdown was a demonstration 
of the strength of the new Georgian state. Smaller demonstrations than last November's 
had, after all, helped bring down the previous regime. For that reason, President 
Saakashvili afterwards declared the demonstrations a "major test in (Georgian) 
statehood," but a test which the country had far from failed: "We have passed the test on 
whether we are Bantustan or a real state, whether we are a failed state, or whether we 
have a real government." Although the words struck foreign ears as somewhat bizarre at 
the time, for a Georgian state which had made bolstering state structures its top goal – far 
ahead of building democracy – Saakashvili's words made perfect sense. Still, the events 
of recent months have made it but impossible for even the most ardent supporters of the 
Rose Revolution not to recognize the disparity between the rhetoric and reality of 
democracy in post-revolution Georgia.  
In the months since November, a number of western think tanks and NGOs, most notably 
the International Crisis Group, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch, have issued 
reports and statements offering severe criticisms of the actions of the Georgian 
government. Similarly, other observers and scholars, such as Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Daria 
Vaisman, and Christopher Walker, have offered critical analyses of their own. Most of 
these writings have sought to place the November crackdown in the context of the 
problems of democracy in Georgia over the last four years, problems often willfully 
overlooked by the U.S. government. Criticism of democratic development in Georgia is 
nothing new. Before the crackdown there had also been critiques from authors such as 
Ana Dolidze, Charles Kupchan, and others, including myself.  
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Although I have been among these critics, and believe that these works play a valuable 
role in both understanding Georgia and U.S. and European policy towards Georgia, in 
this article I seek to explore a related question which may help put these events and 
subsequent works in a broader context. That question is – what were the goals and aims 
of the Rose Revolution? Answering that question can help us evaluate the Rose 
Revolution on its own terms. This should not preclude looking at questions of democracy 
and human rights, but will allow us to more effectively probe some of the government's 
claims, including those regarding state building and economic reform being the top 
priorities, and thus perhaps offer a more nuanced analysis of the Rose Revolution. 
A Revolution without Ideology 
The term Rose Revolution has always been stronger on imagery and alliteration than on 
descriptive or analytical power. In practice, it might be more accurately called a 
democratic breakthrough or the final stage in Georgia's transition away from the Soviet 
system, rather than as a revolution in the traditional sense. It was not, for many reasons, a 
revolution comparable to, for example, the Russian, Chinese, French, or Iranian 
revolutions. The change was not all that dramatic as many of the leaders of Georgia's new 
government, including the president and prime minister, were only a few years removed 
from high ranking positions in the previous government or ruling party of Eduard 
Shevardnadze.  
Another critical reason why the Rose Revolution differed from the aforementioned 
revolutions was that there was no real ideology driving it. The demands of the protesters 
on the streets of Tbilisi in November 2003 were concise and direct; they wanted to see an 
end to the corrupt and failing regime of Eduard Shevardnadze. Thus the primary demand 
was to call for Shevardnadze's resignation – not for some sweeping change in the 
country's governing political philosophy. The leaders of the Rose Revolution, who 
became the leaders of Georgia after 2004, had never been ideologues of any kind. They 
did not, for example, write books or statements describing their vision or ideology. Their 
stated commitments to democracy, prosperity, and a stronger Georgia, while sincere, 
were closer to platitudes than ideology, and were broadly shared throughout the country. 
The absence of a strong ideology did not preclude a vision and set of goals; although 
those goals were admittedly somewhat vague. The most basic promise of Georgia's 
opposition was change; specifically, change from the failed policies and governance of 
the Shevardnadze years. The opposition also spoke about restoring the territorial integrity 
of Georgia, meaning bringing Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into Georgia and 
orienting Georgia towards the West and Western alliances such as NATO and the EU. 
Furthermore, the opposition promised to fight corruption, reinvigorate the economy, and 
strengthen the country's faltering democracy.  
While this represented something of a vision, two things about these goals are worth 
noting. First, they were, to a large extent, a laundry list which were often presented 
without emphasizing priorities or describing means to achieve them. Second, the 
underlying vision of these goals was not substantially different from anything the weak 
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Shevardnadze government claimed it wanted to do. The opposition's – or at least the 
opposition which orchestrated the Rose Revolution – platform was essentially that they 
would be more honest and efficient than the Shevardnadze government in pursuing these 
goals. In this sense, for Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and the other architects of 
the revolution, the 2003 parliamentary elections and to some extent the Rose Revolution 
itself were, as Michael Dukakis might have phrased it, ultimately about competence, not 
ideology.  
Once Shevardnadze resigned and the revolution's primary leader Mikheil Saakashvili was 
elected president in a landslide victory in January 2004, the new Georgian government 
was faced with the task of charting a new direction for their country. And it was only in 
this period that the vision and goals of the Rose Revolution, as well as the order of 
priority for those goals, were ultimately formed.  
Outside Expectations of the Rose Revolution 
The answer to the question of what the goals of the Rose Revolution were differs 
depending on from whose angle we look at it. The Georgian people, the new Georgian 
government, the United States, Europe, and Russia all viewed the Rose Revolution 
differently. The Russians viewed the Rose Revolution as a negative development from its 
earliest days. In their view, the revolution replaced a familiar and weak, but not exactly 
beloved, leader and government with a new aggressive and strongly pro-Western 
government. Additionally, the Russians also felt that the revolution moved Georgia 
further from their orbit and strengthened Western influence in a region considered by 
Russia as its own back yard or, in Russia's terms, near abroad. Not surprisingly from the 
earliest days of the Rose Revolution, Russia set out to undermine and damage the new 
Georgian government. 
The United States' opinion of the Rose Revolution was the mirror opposite of Russia's. 
For the West generally, and the United States specifically, the Rose Revolution was 
viewed as an ideological and political victory. It was immediately hailed as a success 
story for the promotion of democracy and U.S. foreign policy. A great deal of hope was 
placed in the new Georgian government's ability to deliver democracy, reform, and 
economic growth. Accordingly, Europe and the United States sought to support the new 
Georgian government beginning in the days immediately following the resignation of 
President Shevardnadze. 
The general goals and expectations of the region's major foreign powers towards the Rose 
Revolution are relatively easy to determine. However, the question of what the Rose 
Revolution meant to Georgia and Georgians is a bit more complex. First, it should be 
mentioned that the Rose Revolution was not a particularly divisive event in Georgia, as it 
was supported very broadly throughout Georgian society. There were few opponents of 
the revolution who were not directly tied to the corrupt regimes of Shevardnadze and, in 
the Ajara region, local strongman Aslan Abashidze. In the last months of the 
Shevardnadze regime, the general attitude of Georgian society was best summed up by 
the one word slogan taken as name of a radical youth group: "kmara," or "enough." 
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Indeed, by the end of the Shevardnadze years, the Georgian people had had enough – 
enough of corruption, poverty, loss of territory, and of the state's failure to deliver basic 
services.  
While this desire for change was strong, it was not well defined. To some, this change 
meant orientation towards the West and free markets. To others, it meant returning to the 
times of a strong state that provided for them. For many it meant strengthening the 
Georgian state so that the country could defend itself and ensure a secure and 
independent future.  
The task of turning these broad visions into a set of concrete goals fell to the new 
government and its leader, Mikheil Saakasvhili, who on January 4, 2004 – only six weeks 
after Shevardnadze's resignation – was elected president of Georgia with 96 percent of 
the vote in an election which was broadly understood as free and fair. It was an 
extraordinary mandate by almost any measure. However, the question of what the new 
president's new mandate exactly was for, was far from clear.  
The Government's Vision 
As president, Saakashvili's early emphasis on restoring territorial integrity and 
strengthening the Georgian state, rather than on continuing democratic reforms or 
immediate economic assistance, surprised outsiders. However, this approach reflected 
both political sophistication and a keen understanding of the Georgian people on the part 
of the new president. The issue of territorial integrity in particular remained extremely 
important to most Georgians throughout the Shevardnadze years. Saakashvili earned an 
early and unexpected victory in this area midway through his first year in office when he 
succeeded in ousting Ajaran criminal strongman Alsan Abashidze and returned the 
breakaway Ajara region to Georgian sovereignty. Victory in the two other breakaway 
regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was and remains much more difficult as there is 
still no clear foreseeable end to these stalemated conflicts. Regardless, Saakashvili seems 
to understand that returning those regions to Georgia would be an extraordinary 
achievement, and that he will be able to strengthen the support from the Georgian 
electorate by simply being viewed as aggressively seeking their return.  
Similarly, Saakashvili's hard line regarding Russia does not only reflect his views on the 
issue itself, but also stems from the fact that a strong anti-Russian position is good 
politics in Georgia. In times of political hardship, Saakashvili has frequently used rhetoric 
regarding South Ossetia and Abkhazia to rally political support for his government 
among the Georgian electorate, even though such rhetoric is considered inflammatory by 
Russia. Thus, Saakashvili's strong rhetoric has involved a tradeoff where he has gained 
political support domestically at the expense of weakening relations between the two 
countries. It should be noted that Russia's behavior towards Georgia, including its boycott 
of Georgian wines and mineral waters and alleged interventions in domestic Georgian 
politics, is primarily driven by Russia's broader discomfort with the possibility of a strong, 
pro-West, and truly independent Georgia on its southern border. However, Saakashvili 
has made it more difficult for either side to deescalate the conflict.  
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In addition to these external factors, the new government's focus on state building 
stemmed from the fact that, under Shevardnadze, Georgia was bordering on being a 
failed state. Under the old regime, services were not delivered, schools were barely taught, 
the police force acted more as an organized crime ring than as a service and protection to 
the people, crime was widespread, infrastructure had deteriorated and corruption had 
permeated virtually every aspect of government. Solving at least some of these problems 
was thus an essential prerequisite to rebuilding the Georgian economy and infrastructure, 
restoring the country's territorial integrity, and even building democracy. The government 
began attacking these problems with extraordinary energy and vigor as soon as it came 
into power in January of 2004. This work quickly paid off as government corruption was 
substantially reduced; infrastructure was repaired and improved to make life easier for 
many Georgians; the energy situations were improved so that many Georgians were able 
to get reliable electricity, water and heat for the first time in years; and slowly the liberal 
reforms with regards to taxes, investments and finance began to bear fruit as more foreign 
investment came into the country. 
But the outcomes were not all positive. In addition to the striking absence of any kind of 
continued democratic reform or consolidation from the government's initial set of goals 
and accomplishment, the government pursued its ambitious reform agenda with little 
concern for democratic processes including contestation, deliberation, and citizen input. 
Strengthening of the State took a clear priority over strengthening of democracy, and this 
was pursued without any effort to hide the concurrent deemphasizing of democratic 
reform. 
The supposed incompatibility of the dual pursuits of a stronger state and stronger 
democracy is, for the most part, a creation of the Georgian government. The notion that 
these two ideas are somehow in conflict with each other in Georgia, and that these goals 
cannot be pursued simultaneously is very convenient for the government, but there is 
little reason to believe it is actually true. In fact, in Georgia these two goals would have 
been mutually reinforcing. By seeking to strengthen the state without paying sufficient 
attention to the need to continue democratic reforms, the government failed to ensure that 
the public at large understood and had a chance to weigh in on the goals it was attempting 
to pursue. By rapidly pushing through ultra-liberal reforms without any real discussions 
or debates within the legislature or between the government and the people, it made it 
difficult for many Georgians to understand the importance of the reforms or their 
potential impact. This problem was further exacerbated by the government's tendency to 
raise expectations and oversell its accomplishments. 
Additionally, when discontent increased in Georgian society, the democratic avenues for 
expressing such discontent were not sufficiently developed. The legislature was 
weakened early in Saakashvili's term through constitutional reforms which made it 
difficult for legislators to act as a check on executive power. Similarly, press freedoms 
and independent civil society organizations were not as strong as they once were. As a 
result, after the revolution, they were significantly less cable to channel citizens' concerns 
or to hold the government accountable for its policies.  
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Thus, public discontent built and went unaddressed until it spilled into the streets with 
new demonstrations featuring radical, if unrealistic demands. The government was thus 
faced with a significant problem in November 2007; a problem it decided to address by 
using violence to disperse the demonstrations, even though they were already dwindling 
on their own accord. What was more disturbing was, however, the fact that the 
government somehow thought this approach was a wise and justified decision.  
Conclusions 
Despite the demonstrations in November and the events which followed, for the Georgian 
government, the Rose Revolution has been a success. After all, the state is stronger than it 
had been at any time in decades, and probably centuries. However, the government has 
had less success resolving the issues of territorial integrity which still dog the country. 
Additionally, indications of a stronger and more independent Georgia have only made 
relations with Russia more tense. Russia's desire for a weak and malleable southern 
neighbor, meanwhile, continues to create problems for Georgia. The fault here, however, 
probably lies more with Russia, which has maintained a policy of harassment, economic 
boycotts, and intervention with Georgia, more so than with any actions taken by Georgia.  
Democracy in Georgia, however, is in crisis. In the long run, we may see a turnaround in 
this area, but at this time Georgia seems to be moving towards consolidating a strong, but 
not particularly democratic, regime. To deem the Rose Revolution a failure because of 
this, however, misses the larger point. The real failure here is one of Western 
expectations rather than the policies of the Georgia government. Until recently, it 
remained possible for Western governments to overlook the democratic shortcomings and 
to view the Rose Revolution as successful, according to both Western and Georgian 
criteria. That illusion was shattered with the first rounds of rubber bullets and tear gas 
canisters used by the government on November 7, 2007, and cannot yet be fully restored 
even after the relatively smooth election of January 5, during which Saakashvili was 
reelected. Now Western countries and organizations find themselves increasingly unable 
to ignore the differences between their goals and expectations of the Rose Revolution and 
those of the Georgian government. Recognizing this difference is the first step towards 
crafting policies regarding Georgia that is grounded in appropriate expectations and a 
clear understanding of political realities in Georgia. 
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